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Abstract
Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank’s functions have been significantly
altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies,
new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to
unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of
accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional
framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the
European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should
be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in
theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank
should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank’s
role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different
instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank’s democratic account-
ability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European
Union and national parliaments where applicable.
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Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue, numerous changes have intervened in the
European Union’s (EU’s) role in the financial and banking domains following the Great Financial
Crisis (GFC). Among other things, these reforms have significantly affected the European Central
Bank (ECB) because it has now received competences in banking supervision and it is also
involved in a series of new bodies and EU agencies. The creation of the new European System
of Financial Supervision (EFSF) with, among others, the introduction of the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB) started first in 2010 but it soon appeared that these solutions were insufficient
and that steps towards a Banking Union (BU) had to be taken.1 The creation of the BU was meant
to empower the EU to act in three domains that form its pillars: Supervision (Single Supervisory
Mechanism, SSM), Resolution (Single Resolution Mechanism) and Deposit Guarantee (European
Deposit Insurance Scheme, not yet completed).
Consequently, a new agency was created (Single Resolution Board, SRB), and new compe-
tences were conferred upon the ECB: since 2014, it has assumed (new) microprudential and
macroprudential supervisory tasks. Its President continues to chair the ESRB. Furthermore, the
ECB has an observer status in the SRB and sits, in its supervisory capacity, on the European
Banking Authority’s (EBA) Board of Supervisors with no voting rights. The ECB has also played a
key role in managing the crisis by taking part in the Troika alongside the European Commission
(Commission) and the International Monetary Fund.2 The ECB’s competences and functions have
hence been radically increased, both de iure and de facto, as the bank has also been led to stretch its
mandate in the monetary domain by resorting to unconventional monetary policies (such as Out-
right Monetary Transactions and Asset Purchase Programmes).3
Such concentration of powers visible in the numerous ‘hats’ the ECB now wears arguably gives
rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the EU.4 This is due to three main
reasons: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to under-
stand; (ii) the numerous functions the ECB assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in
which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies
or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the
ECB should be held to account.5
Against this background, this article aims at showing to what extent the ECB’s role has multi-
plied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and
what the consequences are for the ECB’s democratic accountability, primarily towards the
1. European Council, ‘European Council 18/19 October 2012 Conclusions’, European Council (2012), https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf.
2. See P. Dermine, ‘Out of the comfort zone? The ECB, financial assistance, independence and accountability’, 26
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019), in this special issue.
3. This has led to several judicial challenges at both national and EU level, most famously in the framework of the OMT/
Gauweiler case. Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag and BVerfG, EU:C:2015:400; (DE)
Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016 – 2 BvR 2728/13. See further on the ECB’s unconventional monetary
policies: A.-L Ho¨genauer and D. Howarth, ‘The Democratic Deficit and European Central Bank Crisis Monetary
Policies, 26Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019), as well as K. Tuori, ‘The ECB’s quantitative
easing programme as a constitutional game changer’, 26Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019),
in this special issue.
4. Czech report in G. Ba´ndi. et al., European Banking Union (Wolters Kluwer, 2016).
5. This is, for instance, the case in the EBA as detailed below.
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European Parliament (EP), as well as towards the Council of the EU (Council) and national
parliaments where applicable. By contrast, the question of the renewed institutional balance
post-crisis remains out of the scope of this article. Additionally, the focus of this article lies in
the ECB’s participation in permanent, formal bodies and institutions; hence, the ECB’s participa-
tion in the Troika is not contended in this analysis. Furthermore, the ECB’s involvement in the
SRB is not considered here either as it only participates as an observer.
Before delving into these questions, a few remarks on the ECB’s and the EU’s democratic
accountability generally are in order. Democratic accountability within the EU has been defined in
article 10 Treaty of the EU (TEU) since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This article
establishes that both the directly elected EP and the Council, whose members are themselves
accountable to their national parliaments or to their people, are in charge of guaranteeing democ-
racy. It follows that the EP, in particular in its quality as sole directly elected EU institution, bears a
special responsibility to ensure democratic accountability and legitimacy, especially in those areas
in which the EU has been attributed exclusive competences, such as monetary policy. Furthermore,
the EP plays a special role in as far as EU institutions should, in principle, be held accountable by
other EU institutions whereas national institutions are to be controlled by national institutions.6 At
the same time, however, national parliaments may be called to play a (direct) role vis-a`-vis the
ECB as well, and in fact the new SSM Regulation establishes direct relationships between the ECB
and national parliaments as detailed below. In the area of banking supervision, their involvement is
justified for several reasons. First, the SSM is a mechanism in whose framework both national and
European institutions are called to intervene and cooperate because the ECB only supervises
Significant Institutions directly; Less Significant Institutions continue to be supervised by National
Competent Authorities (NCAs) under the ultimate watch of the ECB.7 Second, the consequences
of the ECB’s supervisory decisions may have a strong impact on Member States and their economy
thereby justifying national parliamentary oversight.8 Third, those competences had been exercised
at Member State level until the establishment of the Banking Union, and (some) national parlia-
ments had close ties to their NCAs.9 In the area of monetary policy, national parliaments’ involve-
ment has not been foreseen formally. Yet, in this field too their role is arguably justified in light of
the consequences the ECB’s decisions and actions in form of conventional and unconventional
monetary policies have on Member States’ financial stability.10
6. C. Zilioli, ‘The independence of the European Central Bank and its new banking supervisory competences’, in D.
Ritleng (ed.) Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the European Union (Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 176.
7. The distinction in the degree of involvement of the ECB and its consequences for the level of accountability to be
ensured remains out of the scope of this article.
8. Recital 56 of the Preamble to Council Regulation No. 1024/2013/EU of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, [2013] OJ L
287/63 (the SSM Regulation). G. Ter Kuile, L. Wissink and W. Bovenschein, ‘Tailor-made accountability within the
Single Supervisory Mechanism’, 171 Common Market Law Review (2015), p. 155–190.
9. This was, for instance, the case of the French national parliament. C. Caresche, M. Herbillon and D. Quentim,
‘Assemble´e nationale, Rapport d’information n 1665 de´pose´ par la Commission des Affaires europe´ennes sur les
progre`s de l’union bancaire et de l’inte´gration e´conomique au sein de l’Union e´conomique et mone´taire’, Assemble´e
nationale (2013), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/europe/rap-info/i1665.asp, p. 17.
10. These visits to the national parliaments have, however, been found to undermine the relationship to the EP and have
been criticized on that ground. T. Tesche, ‘The ECB and national parliaments: Just a publicity stunt?’, Positive Money
Europe (2018), https://www.positivemoney.eu/2018/09/ecb-national-parliaments-publicity-stunt/.
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This article is organized as follows. It first presents the different roles assumed by the ECB as
well as the democratic accountability mechanisms in place in relation to each of them (Section 2).
An evaluation of those mechanisms and a discussion on the different democratic accountability
standards follows (Section 3). The conclusion presents an outlook (Section 4).
The ECB’s different roles
The different roles the ECB now holds, cover a range of issues and participation in several bodies,
which will be examined here by order of importance of the ECB’s involvement. The ECB’s
primary task is still the exclusive conduct of common monetary policy for the Eurozone with the
objective of maintaining price stability (i). Since autumn 2014, it additionally holds the key
supervisory functions for the Euro area banks (ii). It hosts the ESRB, which is also chaired by its
President (iii). A representative of the supervisory side and one of the ESRB sit on the EBA’s board
of supervisors with no voting right (iv). In each of these instances, specific democratic account-
ability mechanisms have been devised that will be presented here. This first requires an under-
standing of the content of the tasks and then demands a description of those mechanisms.
The ECB and its accountability in the monetary policy
The ECB was designed in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and established in 1998 primarily to
conduct the exclusive community competence in monetary policy. Its independence, and that of
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in general, was clearly anchored, and its objectives
defined: its primary objective would be to maintain price stability, although ‘[w]ithout prejudice to
the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community’
(Article 105 TEC).
In the case of the common monetary policy, the accountability mechanisms need to cover a
broad range of issues. The ECB defines its objectives in a numeric manner and it designs and
operationalizes its operational framework through which it influences financial conditions and
ultimately inflationary developments. Most fundamentally, it conducts the daily monetary policy
operations for the benefit of the euro area by making interest rate decisions, allocating central bank
money to the banking sector and engaging to other means and instruments.
The single currency was introduced in 1999 and from then onwards, regular Monetary dialogues
with the EP started to be organized with the aim to ensure the ECB’s accountability in the exercise
of the EU’s exclusive competence in the monetary policy (Article 3(1)(c) TFEU).11 The Monetary
11. On the Monetary Dialogues, see inter alia, F. Amtenbrink and K. van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank before the EP:
Theory and practice after ten years of monetary dialogue’, 34 European Law Review (2009), p. 561–583; A. Belke,
‘Monetary Dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward’, 4 Intereconomics (2014), p. 204–210; A. Belke,
‘Central Bank Communication: Managing Expectations through the Monetary Dialogue’, ROME Discussion Paper
Series (2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/rmn/wpaper/201704.html, p. 17-04; G. Claeys, M. Hallberg and O. Tsche-
kassin, ‘European Central Bank accountability: How the monetary dialogue could evolve’, Bruegel policy contribution
No. 2014/04 (2014), http://bruegel.org/2014/03/european-central-bank-accountability-how-the-monetary-dialogue-
could-be-improved/; S. Collignon, ‘Central Bank Accountability in Times of Crisis. The Monetary Dialogue:
2009–2014’, European Parliament (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2014/518753/IPO-
L_IDA(2014)518753_EN.pdf.K.Whelan, ‘Note for theEP’sCommittee onEconomic andMonetaryAffairs, PE507.482’,
European Parliament (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201309/20130917ATT71507/
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dialogues now find their legal basis in Article 284(3) TFEU, which states the ECB has to submit
and present the annual report on the activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy to the EP.
This report is commonly presented on the day of its publication to the ECON Committee by the
ECB Vice-President. In this way, the EP has sufficient time to prepare a report in which it may
include its opinion on the report before it is presented by the ECB’s President in plenary.12 The
President of the ECB or other members of the Executive Board may also be heard by the EP’s
competent committee (that is the ECON Committee) at the EP’s non-binding request or on their
own initiative.13 This notwithstanding, the EP’s President appears before the ECON Committee
four times per year as prescribed by the EP’s rules of procedure (Article 126(3) Rules of Procedure
of the European Parliament (EP RoP)). Additionally, members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
may address questions to the ECB (Article 131 EP RoP). Each of them can submit a maximum of
six questions per month, which the ECB must answer within six weeks; if it fails to do so, they may
be addressed during the next hearing of the ECB President before the ECON Committee. Besides
these procedures of accountability ex post, the EP has also been guaranteed certain rights ex ante.
Its consultation is indeed required before the nomination of the members of the Executive Board
(Article 293(2) TFEU). The European Council can, however, go ahead with its candidate even
where the EP has expressed its opposition; the EP may require that the European Council recon-
siders its decisions, but no obligation relies on it to do so (Article 122(4) EP RoP). Both the ex ante
and the ex post accountability channels at the EP’s disposal are thus rather soft, which can be
derived from the ECB’s strong independence.
In practice, these instruments have been fairly used and even more so since the GFC, even if
some criticism has also been voiced, at the beginning at least.
The yearly reports are indeed presented to the EP, which subsequently adopts a resolution.
These resolutions have been used by MEPs to transmit their remarks to the ECB, and they have
tabled many more amendments since the outburst of the GFC than they used to in the past, showing
the report has become a more useful accountability channel.14 Furthermore, it is also noteworthy
that these ECB yearly reports now provide the ground for a real, public, dialogue between the EP
and the ECB as the ECB has started to provide its feedback on those EP resolutions since 2016.15
The Monetary dialogues have been regularly organized, even if no obligation to do so exists;
these four yearly meetings are an indication of the ECB’s commitment to democratic account-
ability, based on its willingness to participate in them. During the crisis, they have been comple-
mented by regular ad hoc hearings (18 between 2008 and 2017).16 The content of the dialogue
sessions has, however, been differently assessed. Some have noted that the ECB has been ‘highly
responsive to the ECON’.17 By contrast, others have critically highlighted that during the dialogue
20130917ATT71507EN.pdf; S.C.W. Eijffinger and E. Mujagic, ‘An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Monetary
Dialogue on theECB’sAccountability andTransparency:AQualitativeApproach’, 39 Intereconomics (2004), p. 190–203.
12. G. Claeys, M. Hallberg and O. Tschekassin, Bruegel policy contribution No. 2014/04 (2014).
13. F. Amtenbrink and K. van Duin, 34 European Law Review (2009), p. 569.
14. N. Fraccaroli, A. Giovannini and J.-F. Jamet, ‘The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the crisis’,
ECB Economic Bulletin No. 5/2018 (2018), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/
ecb.ebart201805_01.en.html, p. 60–61.
15. Ibid., p. 61.
16. Ibid., p. 59.
17. S.C.W. Eijffinger and E. Mujagic, ‘An assessment of the effectiveness of the monetary dialogue on the ECB’s
accountability and transparency: A qualitative approach’, 39 Intereconomics (2004) p. 190–203, 190.
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sessions the ECB President largely repeats what he has already said at the press conferences that
precede those hearings before the ECON Committee.18 The media has thus not developed any
particular interest for the dialogue sessions,19 and the ECB monthly press conferences have in fact
been found to attract the most active following by the press and financial markets.20 Additionally,
for a long time MEPs asked rather general economic questions instead of using this opportunity to
hold the ECB to account.21 This happened even though they receive briefings written by a mon-
etary expert panel prior to each session. MEPs’ task has admittedly become more complex in
recent years because, as is highlighted also by this article, the ECB has been led to assume new
functions and has stretched its mandate. Therefore, the smooth functioning of the Dialogue has
been said to have been threatened by the crisis and the changes it has induced for the ECB, for
instance because of its participation in the Troika.22 The new unconventional monetary policy
measures adopted by the ECB over the past years are arguably more difficult to assess and made
accountable. This is problematic in the sense that the Monetary dialogue would arguably have to be
reformed for functions such as that of financial market supervisor or for the resort to quantitative
easing to be covered within its scope, even if, generally, the ECB’s accountability framework has
been found by the ECB to be resilient in the context of the GFC, allowing for adaptations without
any formal amendments.23
Written questions have been frequently and increasingly resorted to by MEPs (29 questions
have been answered between January and October 201824 and in 2015 alone more questions were
asked than during the whole of the previous parliamentary term between 2009–2014).25 Smaller
parliamentary groups have sent a large number of the questions posed since 2014, which points to
the use of written questions to compensate for a more limited possibility to ask questions during the
dialogue sessions.26 Alongside accountability, questions contribute to enhancing transparency
because both questions and answers are published on the ECB’s website. Nevertheless, their results
are mixed as ‘both the questions and the answers often leave key concepts unexplained or unad-
dressed, often because questions go beyond the remit of the ECB’s mandate’.27 However, espe-
cially the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures are well described in the written
responses.
No similar relationships exist between the ECB and the Council. For example, the ECB’s
annual report is not presented before the Council and no hearings are organized. Nevertheless,
18. G. Claeys, M. Hallberg and O. Tschekassin, Bruegel policy contribution No. 2014/04 (2014), p. 7.
19. S. Heidebrecht, ‘Wie transparent ist die Europa¨ische Zentralbank? Eine international vergleichende Betrachtung vor
dem Hintergrund der weitreichenden Neuerungen zum Januar 2015’, 25 Zeitschrift fu¨r Politikwissenschaft (2015),
p. 501–525, 511.
20. G. Claeys, M. Hallberg and O. Tschekassin, Bruegel policy contribution No. 2014/04 (2014), p. 8.
21. Ibid.
22. A. Belke, ‘AMonetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward’, Intereconomics (2014). p. 204–210,
205.
23. N. Fraccaroli, A. Giovannini and J.-F. Jamet, ECB Economic Bulletin No. 5/2018 (2018)
24. ECB website, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pub/intco/html/index.en.html?skey¼letter.
25. N. Fraccaroli, A. Giovannini and J.-F. Jamet, ECB Economic Bulletin No. 5/2018 (2018), p. 60.
26. Ibid., p. 60.
27. B. Braun, ‘Two sides of the same coin? Independence and accountability of the European Central Bank’, Trans-
parency International EU (2017), http://transparency.eu/resource/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-independence-and-
accountability-of-the-european-central-bank/, p. 39–40.
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the President of the Council and a member of the Commission may participate, without having the
right to vote, in meetings of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The President of
the Council may [also] submit a motion for deliberation to the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank [, and t]he President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to participate in
Council meetings when the Council is discussing matters relating to the objectives and tasks of the
ESCB.28
In practice, the ECB is indeed represented at Economic and Financial Affairs Council meetings,
although in 2018 for instance it was the ECB Vice-President who most often participated.29
It should also be noted that, as anticipated in the introduction, despite the absence of formal
provisions in this sense some direct relationships between the ECB and the national parliaments of
the Euro area Member States have been established since the outbreak of the economic and
financial crisis and the consequent more active role of the ECB. The President of the ECB accepted
to appear before five parliaments at the peak of the crisis (France, Finland, Germany, Italy and
Spain).30 However, these visits have become less frequent as only one was organized in 2016 and
in 2017, respectively.31 Those visits have still taken place in a reduced number of parliaments (six
in total),32 and all of them are the parliaments of important economically Western States, which
raises the problem of the lack of formalization of these exchanges: in the absence of any formal
mechanism, the ECB President could be led to pick and choose the parliaments to which they wish
to appear.33
Consequently, the ECB’s accountability for its action in the monetary policy is mostly assured
by the EP, even if some exchanges with the Council and (some of) the national parliaments of the
euro area do take place.
The ECB’s accountability as banking supervisor
The ECB was vested with new powers in banking supervision with the introduction of the SSM in
November 2014. The ECB became the main banking supervisor in the Euro area and is directly
responsible for supervising all the large banks and for the sufficient supervision of the less
important banks conducted mainly by NCAs. A ‘Chinese wall’ is to separate monetary policy and
supervisory functions.34 To this end, a purposely established Supervisory Board is in practice in
charge of supervision, although its decisions are formally adopted by the ECB’s Governing
Council. Note also that the Supervisory Board submits its decisions to the ECB Governing Council
under a non-objection procedure according to which decisions are adopted unless the Governing
28. Article 284(1) TFEU.
29. A list of participants are available on the Council of the EU’s website.
30. D. Jancic, ‘Accountability of the European Central Bank in a Deepening Economic and Monetary Union’, in D. Jancic
(ed.), National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis: Resilience or Resignation? (Oxford University
Press, 2017), p. 141–158, p. 152 et seq.
31. N. Fraccaroli, A. Giovannini and J.-F. Jamet, ECB Economic Bulletin No. 5/2018 (2018), note 44.
32. A visit was organized in the Netherlands in 2017.
33. D. Fromage and R. Ibrido, ‘Democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight over the ECB. The Banking Union
experience’, LUISS School of Governance - Working paper series 18 (2017), http://sog.luiss.it/sites/sog.luiss.it/files/
SOG%20Working%20Papers%20WP40%20-%202017%20Fromage-Ibrido.pdf.
34. See for a discussion of this separation and its relative character: M. Goldmann, ‘United in diversity? The relationship
between monetary policy and prudential supervision in the Banking Union’, 14 European Constitutional Law Review
(2018), p. 293
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Council objects to them within 10 working days.35 Some safeguards have been put in place to
ensure that what appears to be a lengthy procedure runs smoothly.36 Other solutions that would
have made the Supervisory Board less dependent on the Governing Council were also envisaged,
but they would have required an amendment to the ESCB Statute or would have left the Super-
visory Board in a ‘non-Treaty limbo’.37
The Chair of the Supervisory Board cannot be a member of the ECB’s Governing Council,
although its Vice-Chair is chosen among the members of the ECB’s Executive Board. Further-
more, four ECB representatives sit on the Supervisory Board alongside one representative of each
NCA of the participating Member States. Thus, even if important safeguards have been put in place
to guarantee the separation between the ECB’s monetary and supervisory functions, there is a clear
intertwinement between them, at least for the persons involved.38
The SSM Regulation establishes an original accountability framework:39 it not only establishes
relationships vis-a`-vis the EP and the Council (in line with Article 10 TEU),40 but it also foresees
the existence of relationships with national parliaments.41
Concerning the ECB’s relationships with the EP and the Council, Article 20(1) SSM Regulation
establishes that ‘[t]he ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for
the implementation of this Regulation’. The provisions were developed further in an interinstitu-
tional agreement between the EP and the ECB.42 Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding
was concluded between the ECB and the Council.43
It is foreseen that the EP is involved both ex ante and ex post. Ex ante it may veto the nomination
of the Chair of the Supervisory Board.44 Ex post it receives the SSM annual reports, which are
presented to the ECON Committee that also may invite the Chair to appear before it to report on its
supervisory tasks and MEPs may submit some written questions for written answers to the SSM.45
Confidential oral discussions between the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the ECON Committee and
the Chair of the Supervisory Board may also be organized.46 MEPs may also consult a compre-
hensive and meaningful record of the proceedings of the Supervisory Board in a secure reading
room. Similar procedures apply vis-a`-vis the Council: it receives the annual reports, which are
35. Article 26 of the SSM Regulation.
36. G. lo Schiavo, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Building the new top-down cooperative supervisory governance in
Europe’, in F. Fabbrini, E. Hirsch Ballin and H. Somsen (eds.),What form of government for the European Union and
the Eurozone? (Oxford, Hart, 2015) p. 111–130, 120–121.
37. Ibid., p. 111–130, 121.
38. See more generally on the intertwinement: M. Goldmann, 14 European Constitutional Law Review (2018), p. 300–301.
39. See more details on this and in comparison to the Monetary Dialogue: D. Fromage and R. Ibrido, ‘The ‘Banking
Dialogue’ as a model to improve parliamentary involvement in the Monetary Dialogue?’, 40 Journal of European
Integration (2018) p. 295–308.
40. Article 20 of the SSM Regulation.
41. Article 21 of the SSM Regulation.
42. Articles 20-29 of the SSM Regulation and Interinstitutional agreement between the EP and the European Central Bank
on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks
conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, [2013] OJ L 320/1.
43. European Central Bank, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of the European Union and the Eur-
opean Central Bank on the cooperation on procedures related to the SSM’, European Central Bank (2013), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_eucouncil_ecb.pdf.
44. Article 26(3) of the SSM Regulation.
45. Article 20 of the SSM Regulation.
46. Article 20(8) of the SSM Regulation.
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presented to ‘the euro Group in the presence of representatives from any participating Member
State whose currency is not the euro’.47 It may be heard by the Euro group on the Euro group’s
request as well. Like MEPs, the Euro group may put written questions to the ECB.
National parliaments’ powers are more circumscribed as the SSM Regulation does not mention
any relation of accountability vis-a`-vis the ECB. Article 21 of the SSM Regulation is simply titled
‘National parliaments’. This is in line with the principle – recalled in the introduction – according
to which accountability is to be ensured at the same institutional level.
National parliaments, similar to the EP and the Council, receive the SSM annual reports; and
they may submit reasoned observations to the ECB. They may also invite the Chair or a member of
the Supervisory Board for an exchange of views ‘in relation to the supervision of credit institutions
in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority’.48 Further-
more, they ‘may request the ECB to reply in writing to any observations or questions’.49
In practice, the ECB’s annual reports on supervisory activities have been presented to the
ECON Committee, and two ordinary meetings and two to three ad hoc exchanges of views
have, on average, been organized every year between the EP and the ECB thus far.50 Ques-
tions have been regularly submitted by MEPs.51 The two yearly exchanges between the Euro
group and the ECB foreseen by the Memorandum of Understanding were respected and
surpassed in 2017. In fact, in 2017, the important crises faced by some banks generally gave
rise to a notable increase in the exchanges between the ECB, and the Euro group and the EP
respectively.52
By contrast, the relationship with national parliaments is, still, scarce. Two exchanges of views
per year have been organized involving five parliamentary chambers: the German Bundestag
(Finance Committee), the French National Assembly (European Affairs Committee), the Dutch
House of Representatives (Finance Committee), the Italian Senate (twice) (Treasury and Finance
Committee) and the Slovenian National Assembly.53 They have also posed two questions – whose
answers were published on the ECB’s website – in 2017.54
Most of these new instruments have hence been used by the EP and the Council, whereas
national parliaments have only timidly resorted to them so far.
47. Article 20(3) of the SSM Regulation.
48. Article 21(3) of the SSM Regulation.
49. Article 21(2) of the SSM Regulation.
50. The ECB Annual Reports on supervisory and the ECON Committee are available at European Parliament, ‘Com-
mittees: Economic and Monetary Affairs – Banking Union’, European Parliament (2019), http://www.europarl.eur-
opa.eu/committees/en/econ/banking-union.html.
51. The number of questions rose from 10 in 2014 to 39 in 2016 and 2017. N. Fraccaroli, A. Giovannini and J.-F. Jamet,
ECB Economic Bulletin No. 5/2018 (2018), p. 57.
52. For more detail on the relationship between EP and ECB so far, see D. Fromage and R. Ibrido, ‘The Banking Union and
its accountability dimension in The European Banking Union and the role of law’, G. lo Schiavo (ed.), The European
Banking Union and the role of law (Edward Elgar, 2019, forthcoming).
53. In addition to this, there were two exchanges of views with the Italian parliament in 2017.
54. European Central Bank, ‘Annual report on supervisory authorities 2017’, European Central Bank (2018), https://
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/annual-report/pdf/ssm.ar2017.-
en.pdf?63a120afab30be18171c083089709229, p. 82.
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The ECB’s participation in the ESRB
The ECB is extensively involved in the ESRB, which was created in 2010 with a view to mon-
itoring risks to financial stability in the EU.55 This takes advantage of the fact that ‘the European
Central Bank (ECB) can make a significant contribution to the effective macro-prudential over-
sight of the Union’s financial system’.56 The ESRB may issue warnings and recommendations for
remedial actions, but it may only monitor the actions taken by the addressee(s) of such recom-
mendation; it may not constrain its (their) actions as its warnings and recommendations are not
legally binding, although the ‘comply or explain’ rule applies.
The ECB’s President chairs the ESRB57 and represents the ESRB externally,58 and ‘[t]he first
Vice-Chair shall be elected by and from the members of the General Council of the ECB’.59 The
President and the Vice-President of the ECB are members of the General Board with voting rights,
alongside the governors of the national central banks, a member of the Commission, the chair-
persons of the three European Supervisory agencies,60 the Chair and the two Vice-Chairs of the
Advisory Scientific Committee and the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee.61 In addition
to this, the secretariat of the ESRB is ensured by the ECB to have ‘sufficient human and financial
resources’.62 The ECB also provides analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to
the ESRB.63 As the ESRB is a ‘body’ that does not have any binding powers but shall merely
express an opinion; the involvement of the ECB’s President and Vice-President is beneficial and
contributes to build up the ESRB’s reputation; the choice of the ECB as a host institution for the
ESRB was guided by the fact that ‘the ESRB could benefit from the visibility, independence and
strong reputation of the ECB’.64 However, a need for the ESRB to become more autonomous from
the ECB was also identified,65 highlighting the existing tensions.
Interestingly, the ESRB Regulation contains specific provisions on impartiality. Article 7 of the
ESRB Regulation indeed states that
55. More on the background of this creation: A. Spendzharova, ‘Is more ‘‘Brussels’’ the solution? New European Union
Member States preferences about the European financial architecture’, 50 Journal of Common Market Studies (2012),
p. 315–334, especially p. 316–318.
56. Recital 7 of the Preamble to Council Regulation No. 1096/2010/EU conferring specific tasks upon the European
Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, [2010] OJ L 331/162 (the ECB-ESRB
Regulation).
57. Article 5(1) of Regulation No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing an ESRB Regulation, [2010] OJ L
331/1 (the ESRB Regulation). The ESRB Regulation establishes that an evaluation has to be done after the first
mandate to evaluate whether the ECB President should remain entrusted with the task to chair the ESRB. This was
maintained, after the Commission – upon a consultation with stakeholders – deemed this arrangement to have ‘a lot of
merits’, even if the creation of the figure of Managing Director was also encouraged. European Commission, Report on
the mission and organisation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), COM(2014) 508 final, p. 8.
58. Article 5(8) of the ESRB Regulation.
59. Article 5(2) of the ESRB Regulation.
60. European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
61. Article 6(1) of the ESRB Regulation.
62. Article 3(1) of the ESRB Regulation.
63. Recital 9 of the Preamble to the ESRB Regulation.
64. European Commission, Report on the mission and organisation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),
COM(2014) 508 final, p. 6.
65. Ibid., p. 12.
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[w]hen participating in the activities of the General Board and of the Steering Committee or when
conducting any other activity relating to the ESRB, the members of the ESRB shall perform their duties
impartially and solely in the interest of the Union as a whole. They shall not seek nor take instructions
from the Member States, the Union institutions or any other public or private body. [Furthermore,
n]either the Member States, the Union institutions nor any other public or private body shall seek to
influence the members of the ESRB in the performance of the tasks set out in Article 3(2).66
Some accountability mechanisms of the ESRB vis-a`-vis the EP are contained in the ESRB
Regulation.67 The ESRB’s Chair shall appear before the EP at least annually ‘marking the pub-
lication of the ESRB’s annual report to the European Parliament and the Council’.68 The ESRB
Regulation acknowledges that the President of the ECB appears before the EP in a similar manner
as is the case with the Monetary Dialogue and thus contains some safeguard to ensure these
procedures are not combined. It specifically states that ‘[t]hat hearing shall be conducted sepa-
rately from the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the President of the
ECB.’69 Further to this, EP committees may request the ESRB’s Chair (that is the ECB President)
to attend hearings.70 Interestingly, some confidential oral discussions can be arranged between the
ESRB’s Chair and the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the EP’s ECON Committee ‘on the ongoing
activities of the ESRB’ at least twice a year, and more if necessary.71
Apart from the one published in June 2014, the annual reports of the ESRB are not very detailed
concerning the practice of these instruments; they mention regular hearings and confidential oral
discussions, but little data are included. Nevertheless, the publication of the opening speeches of
the Chair on the ESRB’s website allows us to trace back hearings before the ECON committee.
Since becoming the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi has appeared before the ECON committee
in this role two to three times a year.72 According to the 2012 Annual Report, two confidential oral
discussions were also organized in May 2011 and in November 2012.73
Those hearings are key forMEPs to be able to fulfil their duty of accountability: ‘[t]he introductory
statement of the ESRBChair is [indeed] an important tool for providingMEPswith regular updates on
the ESRB’s outlook for systemic risk and with insights into major strands of the ESRB’s work.’74
The Council, in contrast, receives the ESRB’s annual reports75 and like the EP and the European
Commission, it may request the ESRB to examine specific issues,76 but no further exchanges are
formally planned between the Council and the ESRB.
66. Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the ESRB Regulation.
67. Article 19 of the ESRB Regulation.
68. Article 19(1) of the ESRB Regulation.
69. Article 19(1) of the ESRB Regulation.
70. Article 19(4) of the ESRB Regulation.
71. Article 19(5) of the ESRB Regulation.
72. Data extracted from the ESRB website unless indicated otherwise: European Systemic Risk Board, ‘Speeches Pub-
lished in 2017’, ESRB (2017), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/speeches/date/2017/html/index.en.html.
73. European Systemic Risk Board, ‘Annual Report 2012’, ESRB (2013), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ar/2013/
esrbar2012en.pdf?bdef0ab5b0b82e6b9545fe6284ee6a76, p. 45. ES. No additional data are available on the confi-
dential oral discussions.
74. European Systemic Risk Board, ‘Annual Report 2013’, ESRB (2014), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ar/2014/
esrbar2013en.pdf?7e65b0ab3969160bcea5604bdba12532, p. 59.
75. Article 19(1) of the ESRB Regulation
76. Article 19(3) of the ESRB Regulation.
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The EP is thus the primary responsible of ensuring the ESRB’s accountability, and the ECB
President regularly appears in its capacity as ESRB Chair before it.
The ECB’s relationship to the EBA
The EBA – an EU agency – was established in 2011 as part of the EFSF. It contributes to ensuring
consistent prudential regulation and supervision within the EU by adopting Binding Technical
Standards and Guidelines that compose the European Single Rulebook in banking. The Single
Rulebook defines a single set of harmonized prudential rules for financial institutions. The ECB is
closely involved in the activities of the EBA in its capacity as banking supervisor. Indeed, a
representative of the Supervisory Board is a member of the EBA’s Board of Supervisors, although
it does not have a vote.77
This ECB/SSM involvement in the functioning of the EBA, mainly as a member of the Board of
Supervisors with no voting rights, does not appear – at first sight – to complicate the ECB’s
accountability framework. In the functional construction of the BU, the role of the EBA seems
to be fairly well described and technical; in fact, the EBA’s potential remained so circumscribed
that the creation of the BU was deemed necessary only a few years after it was established.78 The
ECB’s influence has not been as circumscribed as could have been anticipated in light of its mere
role as a member with no voting rights, and this matters in analysing the ECB’s accountability
standards. SSM representatives do take part in EBA standing committees and working groups, and
they can informally try and influence national supervisors’ positions. In fact, in the original draft of
the SSM Regulation, those positions had to be coordinated;79 this proposal was not adopted due to
British opposition. Should the idea of granting the SSM a right to vote be pursued post Brexit, the
difficulty in weighing this Eurozone vote and the need to decide whether it should replace Euro-
zone Member States votes or not are, however, questions that would first need to be answered.
As an EU agency, the EBA is accountable to the EP, the Council and the European Commis-
sion.80 The EBA shall transmit its work programme and its annual report to those three institutions
(the annual report being additionally also forwarded to the European Court of Auditors and the
European Economic and Social Committee).81 The EP also has a right of veto over the Chairper-
son’s nomination,82 as well as over the Executive Director’s nomination.83
77. Article 40(1)(d) of Regulation No. 1093/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, [2010] OJ L 331/12 (the EBA Regulation).
78. More on this: G. lo Schiavo, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Building the new top-down cooperative supervisory
governance in Europe’, in F. Fabbrini, E. Hirsch Ballin and H. Somsen (eds.), What form of government for the
European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart, 2015) p. 111–130, 114–115.
79. ‘( . . . ) to reflect the ECB’s supervisory responsibilities, representatives from competent authorities from participating
Member States shall coordinate and express, for matters falling in the competences of the ECB, a common position’.
Explanatory Memorandum, Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, COM(2012) 511 final, Point 4.1.3.
80. It may of course establish relationship to national parliaments too, and its Chairperson appeared before the Italian
Senate in July 2017.
81. Article 43(4) and 43(5) of the EBA Regulation respectively.
82. Article 48(2) of the EBA Regulation.
83. Article 51(2) of the EBA Regulation.
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Its Chairperson is appearing more regularly before the ECON Committee too,84 because the EP
and the Council ‘may invite the Chairperson or his alternate to make a statement, while fully
respecting his independence’.85 Furthermore, the ‘Chairperson shall report in writing on the main
activities of the Authority to the European Parliament when requested and at least 15 days before
making [such] statement’.86 Although the EBA Regulation defines some of the elements that need
to be included in such a report, the EP may request additional information on an ad hoc basis.87
As an EU agency, the EBA is eventually dependent on the Commission’s approval, hence it is
logical that its accountability framework differs from that of the ECB and of the ESRB, although in
this framework, it is the EP that is primarily in charge of guaranteeing democratic accountability
and the ties between the EP and the EBA are becoming increasingly tight.
Evaluation
The ECB participates in a variety of institutions and bodies in which it assumes a variety of roles
that also differ largely in theory and in practice; the resulting institutional framework is particularly
complex. This section does not aim to provide an evaluation of the ECB’s participation in those
bodies per se, that is from the point of view of their economic efficiency or desirability. The focus
here lays on the impact of creating such a complex framework in terms of democratic
accountability.
It first results from the different accountability mechanisms in place that the President of the
ECB is regularly led to appear before the EP ECON Committee in their different capacity. For
instance, the appearances as Chair of the ESRB and as part of the monetary dialogue are usually
held back to back,88 and some have, in fact, pleaded for the establishment of an ESRB Managing
Director to make it easier to distinguish between the ESRB and the ECB.89 As the Chair of the
Supervisory Board is regularly heard by the ECON Committee as well, it may be increasingly
difficult for MEPs to identify in which framework they need to ask a particular question to the
ECB.
In contrast, because of the intertwinement of the different procedures and in particular because
of the concentration of powers in the ECB’s President/Executive Board, in relation to a specific
decision in supervisory matters, the EP may have to hold to account both the Chair of the Super-
visory Board in the framework of the Banking Dialogue and the President of the ECB in the
framework of the Monetary dialogue. Beyond this, if the ‘Chinese wall’ between the ECB’s
functions as banking supervisor with a responsibility for monetary policy is opaque, contradictory
decisions may be taken. It follows that the Governing Council may be led to approve contradictory
84. EBA, ‘EBA Management speeches’, EBA (2019), http://www.eba.europa.eu/news-press/calendar?p_p_id¼8&tabs1¼
events&_8_eventTypes¼eba-management-speech and J-P. Salter, ‘The multiple accountabilities of the European
Banking Authority’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2017), p. 1, 10.
85. Article 50(1) of the EBA Regulation.
86. Article 50(2) of the EBA Regulation.
87. Article 50(3) of the EBA Regulation.
88. European Commission, Report on the mission and organisation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),
COM(2014) 508 final, p. 6.
89. European Commission, Staff Working Document accompanying the Report on the mission and organisation of the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), COM (2014) 508 final Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying
the document Report To the European Parliament and the Council on the mission and organisation of the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), SWD(2014) 260 final, p. 17.
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decisions which, in turn, would make any mechanism of accountability particularly difficult to
execute.90 Considering all this, it becomes clear that at the very least the ‘Chinese wall’ should not
be totally opaque, that the ECB representative that answers MEPs’ questions should interpret the
boundaries between the different functions of the ECB as flexibly as possible, and that if the ECB
is to keep both its ‘hats’, joint dialogue sessions may be useful in the future to guarantee adequate
accountability. This would avoid parliamentary questions remaining unanswered in the future
because they are asked in the wrong forum, as has happened before.
As regards practice so far, the available instruments are regularly used by the EP and by the
Council/Euro group where provided. The question can nevertheless be asked whether the institu-
tions in charge of holding the ECB, or the institutions and bodies in which it is involved, to account
are truly in a position to do so. In other words, the ECB’s full independence prevents the drawing of
any direct consequence, as does the ECB’s full financial independence, hence only political
sanctions are left – but is this even a possibility? The ECB’s mandate has become increasingly
broad and blurred, and the matters it decides upon ever more technical so it is legitimate to wonder
whether MEPs, or MPs, can appropriately assess its actions. This is more difficult when transpar-
ency is not fully guaranteed and access to relevant information is not straightforward.91 Addition-
ally, in the case of the EBA, the ECB’s formal role is limited but in practice, it is key; this results in
an accountability gap as no specific mechanisms exist to hold the ECB to account for its actions in
that framework.
National parliaments are so far (formally) only involved in the BU, although in practice the
ECB (monetary function) has entered in a dialogue with some of them. It is contended here that
there is a need to extend this relationship to the monetary function to increase the ECB’s demo-
cratic legitimacy, and this should take the form of clearly defined mechanism that could remain
informal like the Political Dialogue between the European Commission and national parliaments.
Interparliamentary cooperation between the EP and national parliaments could also be useful.92
Conclusion
The increased complexity that results from the ECB’s involvement in a variety of institutions and
(informal) bodies arguably makes it increasingly difficult for MEPs and other actors in charge of
ensuring democratic accountability to play their role. These difficulties are amplified for the
general public, whose trust in the ECB has been steadily decreasing in the past years.93 It is thus
of outmost importance that the existing mechanisms are used to their maximum capacity, and that a
simplification and clarification of the institutional framework in place remains a target for future
reforms. Independently, the question can legitimately be asked of whether the EP is the right
institution to hold the ECB to account in all its capacities; for decisions affecting Eurozone
Member States only, perhaps another institutional setting should be developed with Eurozone
parliaments’ (collective?) participation. Even if national parliaments can be involved in the
90. M. Goldmann, 14 European Constitutional Law Review (2018), p. 301.
91. See M. Bozina Beros, ‘ECB’s accountability within the SSM framework: mind the (transparency) gap’, 26Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019), in this special issue.
92. D. Fromage and R. Ibrido, ‘The Banking Union and its accountability dimension’, in G. lo Schiavo (ed.), The European
Banking Union and the role of law (Edward Elgar, 2019, forthcoming).
93. See C. Koop and C. Reh, ‘Europe’s Bank and Europe’s Citizens: Accountability, Transparency – Legitimacy?’, 26
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019), in this special issue.
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banking supervision area, they have, so far, established almost no relationship with the ECB; there
is thus still a need for closer involvement of national institutions in light of the additional transfer
of powers to the EU level and the impact on Member States. The European Commission stated in
2012 that
in multilevel governance systems, accountability should be ensured at that level where the respective
executive decision is taken, whilst taking due account of the level where the decision has an impact
[( . . . ) and] in developing EMU as in European integration generally, the level of democratic legiti-
macy always needs to remain commensurate with the degree of transfer of sovereignty from Member
States to the European level.94
One can wonder whether this condition has really been respected.
To answer this question, future research should examine the content of the exchanges between
the ECB and the institutions in charge of holding it accountable; it should also distinguish between
the different actions the ECB performs within the different mechanisms, as well as consider the
relations between national parliaments and national institutions because the absence of a relation-
ship between national parliaments and an EU institution may be compensated for by closer pre-
existing ties between them and their respective national institution. This would usefully contribute
to the ongoing debate of whether the ECB should be submitted to different standards of account-
ability and independence in its different capacities.
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